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Abstract
This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen’s (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker
notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of
the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns.
An individual i is honest when she states her true preferences as well as rankings
(not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences of
individuals in her honesty standard. The paper o§ers a necessary condition for Nash
implementation, called partial-honesty monotonicity, and shows that in an independent
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JEL classification: C72; D71; D82.
Keywords: Nash implementation; partial-honesty; non-connected honesty standards,
independent domain.

∗

Special thanks go to Luis Corchón and Hans Peters, whose comments and suggestions have led to
substantial improvements in the paper. We are also grateful to an associate editor and a referee of this journal
for their helpful and thoughtful comments and suggestions. They are not responsible for any remaining
deficiencies.
†
Corresponding author: Michele Lombardi, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow,
G12 8QQ, United Kingdom, e-mail: michele.lombardi@glasgow.ac.uk.
‡
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 200 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA
01003, USA; The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-0004
Japan; and School of Management, Kochi University of Technology, Kochi 782-8502, Japan, e-mail:
n_yoshihara_1967@yahoo.co.jp.

1. Introduction
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism or game form
with the property that for each profile of participants’ preferences, the equilibrium outcomes
of the mechanism played with those preferences coincide with the recommendations that a
given social choice rule (SCR) would prescribe for that profile. If that mechanism design
exercise can be accomplished, the SCR is said to be implementable. The fundamental paper
on implementation in Nash equilibrium is thanks to Maskin (1999; circulated since 1977), who
proves that any SCR that can be Nash implemented satisfies a remarkably strong invariance
condition, now widely referred to as Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, he shows that when
the mechanism designer faces at least three individuals, a SCR is Nash implementable if it
is Maskin monotonic and satisfies the condition of no veto-power, subsequently, Maskin’s
theorem. Maskin (1999) obtains his original result by means of a mechanism that requires
each individual to report, besides two auxiliary data, the whole description of the state.
In a preference model, this means that each participant is asked to report preferences that
members of the society have (preference profile).
Since Maskin’s theorem, economists have also been interested in understanding how to
circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity by exploring the possibilities
o§ered by approximate (as opposed to exact) implementation (Matsushima, 1988; Abreu
and Sen, 1991), as well as by implementation in refinements of Nash equilibrium (Moore and
Repullo, 1988; Abreu and Sen, 1990; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992) and by
repeated implementation (Kalai and Ledyard, 1998; Lee and Sabourian, 2011; Mezzetti and
Renou, 2016). One additional way around those limitations is o§ered by implementation
with partially-honest individuals.
A partially-honest individual is an individual who deceives the mechanism designer when
the truth poses some obstacle to her material well-being. Thus, she does not deceive when
the truth is equally e¢cacious. Simply put, a partially-honest individual follows the maxim,
“Do not lie if you do not have to” to serve her material interest.
In a general environment, a seminal paper on Nash implementation problems involving partially-honest individuals is Dutta and Sen (2012), whose Theorem 1 (p. 157) shows
that for implementation problems involving at least three individuals and in which there is at
least one partially-honest individual, the Nash implementability is assured by no veto-power.
Similar positive results are uncovered in other environments by Matsushima (2008a,b), Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Kartik et al. (2014), Lombardi and Yoshihara (2016b,c), Saporiti
(2014) and Ortner (2015). Thus, there are far fewer limitations for Nash implementation
when there are partially-honest individuals.1
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A pioneering work on the impact of decency constraints on Nash implementation problems is Corchón
and Herrero (2004). These authors propose restrictions on sets of strategies available to agents that depend
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As in Maskin’s (1999) original result, Dutta and Sen’s (2012) Theorem 1 uses a mechanism that asks participants to report, among two auxiliary data, the whole preference profile.
Moreover, according to Dutta and Sen’s (2012) definition of honesty, a participant’s play is
honest if she plays a strategy choice which is veracious in its preference profile announcement
component. In this paper, we consider weaker notions of honesty and then investigate the
robustness of Dutta and Sen’s (2012) Theorem 1 to these notions of truth-telling.
Under a general arbitrary definition of truth-telling, the paper shows that any SCR
that can be Nash implemented with partially-honest individuals satisfies a variant of Maskin
monotonicity, called weak Maskin monotonicity. First, this condition requires that every
participant is able to find a set of truthful outcomes when x is one of the outcomes selected
by a given SCR at state θ and the state moves from θ to θ0 . Second, it prescribes that a
partially-honest individual would judge a truthful outcome and the outcome x as equally
good according to her preferences in state θ0 if this x is one of the outcomes selected by a
given SCR at state θ but is not selected by the SCR when there is a monotonic change of
preferences around x from θ to θ0 . However, this condition is too weak to have any bite,
because one can construct the set of truthful outcomes in a way that the outcome x is one
of its elements.
This result implies that if one would like to derive a Maskin monotonicity-type condition
as a necessary condition that imposes non-trivial restrictions on the class of implementable
SCRs, it is bound to give a meaning to the notion of honesty. Clearly, its notion needs to be
compatible with the implementation environment as well as be based on testable parameters.
Since the main goal of this study is to o§er notions of honesty that are weaker than
that employed by Dutta and Sen (2012) and then to investigate the robustness of their
result to these notions, we model individual i’s honesty standard as a profile of (possibly
non-empty) collections of ordered pairs of outcomes, one for each member of society, over
which individual i feels truth-telling concerns.
This notion of individual i’s honesty standard is flexible enough to allow the individual i’s
collection for individual j to be empty. Our interpretation is that in this case individual i does
not have any truth-telling concern about individual j. We also adopt the view that individual
i concerns herself with at least her own self; that is, her own collection of ordered pairs is
not empty. Also, we require that the collection over which individual i feels truth-telling
concerns about herself has the property that she is able to reveal truthfully her own complete
ranking of outcomes. This requirement turned to be an indispensable condition for honesty
under which a non-trivial Maskin monotonicity-type condition for Nash implementation can
be derived as a necessary condition (details are in remark 2).
on the state of the world. They refer to these strategies as decent strategies and study Nash implementation problems in decent strategies. For a particular formulation of decent strategies, they are also able to
circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity.
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Thus, an individual i is honest provided that she states her true preferences as well as
rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true preferences
of individuals in her honesty standard. It is worth emphasizing that this notion of truthtelling encompasses, as a special case, that of Dutta and Sen (2012).
With these notions of honesty and honesty standards, the paper shows that any SCR
that can be Nash implemented with partially-honest individuals satisfies a variant of Maskin
monotonicity, called partial-honesty monotonicity. The idea of this axiom is quite intuitive.
If x is one of the outcomes selected by a given SCR at state θ but is not selected when there is
a monotonic change of preferences around x from θ to θ0 , then the rankings of outcomes in the
honesty standard of a partially-honest individual has been altered by this monotonic change.
This condition is trivially satisfied when partially-honest individuals concern themselves with
the announcement of the whole preference profile as in Dutta and Sen (2012). However, it
can have more bite when weaker notions of honesty are considered.
And indeed, in section 5, we specialize our notions as follow. This section considers a
specific type of an individual honesty standard, which is modeled as a subset of individuals
involved with an implementation problem. Our interpretation is that participant i concerns
herself with the truth-telling of individuals in her honesty standard when she plays a strategy
choice. Also, this definition endorses the view that an individual concerns herself with
at least her own self. Thus, an individual i is truthful provided that she states the true
preferences of individuals in her honesty standard. Moreover, we consider what we call nonconnected honesty standards. Simply put, individual honesty standards are connected if some
participant is in the honest standard of every other participant. When that is not the case,
we call them non-connected honesty standards. In other words, they are non-connected if
every participant is excluded from the honesty standard of another participant.
In an independent domain of preferences, where the set of the profiles of participants’
preferences takes the structure of the Cartesian product of individual preferences, we show
that partial-honesty monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity whenever there exists at least one partially-honest individual and individuals’ honesty standards are nonconnected. Thus, under those hypotheses, Maskin’s theorem provides an almost complete
characterization of SCRs that are Nash implementable in the society with partially-honest
individuals.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and outlines the implementation model, with the notions of truth-telling and
of an honesty standard presented in section 3. Section 4 presents our necessary condition,
with the equivalence result o§ered in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1 Basic framework
We consider a finite set of individuals indexed by i 2 N = {1, · · · , n}, which we will refer
to as a society. The set of outcomes available to individuals is X. The information held by
the individuals is summarized in the concept of a state. Write Θ for the domain of possible
states, with θ as a typical state. In the usual fashion, individual i’s preferences in state θ are
given by a complete and transitive binary relation, subsequently an ordering, Ri (θ) over the
set X. The corresponding strict and indi§erence relations are denoted by Pi (θ) and Ii (θ),
respectively. The preference profile in state θ is a list of orderings for individuals in N that
are consistent with that state and is denoted by RN (θ).
We assume that the mechanism designer does not know the true state. We assume,
however, that there is complete information among the individuals in N . This implies that
the mechanism designer knows the preference domain consistent with the domain Θ. In this
paper, we identify states with preference profiles.
The goal of the mechanism designer is to implement a SCR F : Θ ! X where
F (θ) is non-empty for any θ 2 Θ. We shall refer to x 2 F (θ) as an F -optimal outcome at θ. Given that individuals will have to be given the necessary incentives to reveal
the state truthfully, the mechanism!designer delegates the choice to individuals accordY
ing to a mechanism Γ ≡
Mi , g , where Mi is the strategy space of individual i and
i2N
Y
g : M ! X, the outcome function, assigns to every strategy profile m 2 M ≡
Mi a
i2N

unique outcome in X. We shall sometimes write (mi , m−i ) for the strategy profile m, where
m−i = (m1 , · · · , mi−1 , mi+1 , · · · , mn ).

2.2 Intrinsic preferences for honesty
An individual who has an intrinsic preference for truth-telling can be thought of as an
individual who is torn by a fundamental conflict between her deeply and ingrained propensity
to respond to material incentives and the desire to think of herself as an honest person. In
this paper, the theoretical construct of the balancing act between those contradictory desires
is based on two ideas.
First, the pair (Γ, θ) acts as a “context” for individuals’ conflicts. The reason for this
is that an individual who has an intrinsic preference for honesty can categorize her strategy
choices as truthful or untruthful relative to the state θ and the mechanism Γ designed by
the mechanism designer to govern the communication with individuals. That categorization
can be captured by the following notion of truth-telling correspondence:
4

Definition 1 For each Γ and each individual i 2 N , individual i’s truth-telling correspondence is a (non-empty) correspondence TiΓ : Θ ! Mi such that, for each θ 2 Θ and
mi 2 TiΓ (θ), the strategy choice mi encodes information that is consistent with the state θ.
Strategy choices in TiΓ (θ) will be referred to as truthful strategy choices for θ.
Second, in modeling intrinsic preferences for honesty, we endorse the notion of partiallyhonest individuals introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012). First, a partially-honest individual
is an individual who responds primarily to material incentives. Second, she strictly prefers
to tell the truth whenever lying has no e§ect on her material well-being. That behavioral
choice of a partially-honest individual can be modeled by introducing an individual’s ordering over the strategy space M which contains the information of this individual’s ordering
over X, because that individual’s preference between being truthful and being untruthful
is contingent upon announcements made by other individuals as well as the outcome(s) obtained from them. By following standard conventions of orderings, write <Γ,θ
for individual
i
i’s ordering over M in state θ whenever she is confronted with the mechanism Γ. Formally,
our notion of a partially-honest individual is as follows:
Definition 2 For each Γ, individual i 2 N is partially-honest if for all θ 2 Θ individual i’s
intrinsic preference for honesty <Γ,θ
on M satisfies the following properties: for all m−i and
i
0
all mi , mi 2 Mi it holds that:
(i) If mi 2 TiΓ (θ), m0i 2
/ TiΓ (θ) and g (m) Ri (θ) g (m0i , m−i ), then m ≻Γ,θ
(m0i , m−i ).
i
(ii) In all other cases, m <Γ,θ
(m0i , m−i ) if and only if g (m) Ri (θ) g (m0i , m−i ).
i

An intrinsic preference for honesty of individual i is captured by the first part of the above
definition, in that, for a given mechanism Γ and state θ, individual i strictly prefers the
strategy profile (mi , m−i ) to (m0i , m−i ) provided that the outcome g (mi , m−i ) is at least as
good as g (mi , m−i ) according to her ordering Ri (θ) and that mi is truthful for θ and m0i is
not truthful for θ.
If individual i is not partially-honest, this individual cares for her material well-being
associated with outcomes of the mechanism and nothing else. Then, individual i’s ordering
over M is just the transposition into space M of individual i’s relative ranking of outcomes.
More formally:
Definition 3 For each Γ, individual i 2 N is not partially-honest if for all θ 2 Θ, individual
i’s intrinsic preference for honesty <Γ,θ
on M satisfies the following property:
i
m <Γ,θ
m0 () g (m) Ri (θ) g (m0 ) , for all m, m0 2 M .
i

5

2.3 Implementation problems
In formalizing the mechanism designer’s problem with partially-honest individuals, we
first introduce an informational assumption and discuss its implications for our analysis. It
is:
Assumption 1 There exists at least one partially-honest individual in the society N .
The above assumption, combined with the assumption that there is complete information among the individuals, implies that the mechanism designer only knows the set Θ, the
fact that there is at least one partially-honest individual among the individuals, but he does
not know either the true state or the identity (or identities) of the partially-honest individual(s). Indeed, the mechanism designer cannot exclude any member(s) of society from being
partially-honest purely on the basis of Assumption 1. Therefore, the following considerations
are in order from the viewpoint of the mechanism designer.
An environment is described by two parameters, (θ, H): a state θ and a conceivable set
of partially-honest individuals H. We denote by H a typical conceivable set of partiallyhonest individuals in N , with h as a typical element, and by H the class of conceivable sets
of partially-honest individuals.
$
%
A mechanism Γ and an environment (θ, H) induce a strategic game Γ, <Γ,θ,H , where:
&
'
<Γ,θ,H ≡ <Γ,θ
i

i2N

is a profile of orderings over the strategy space M as formulated in Definition 2 and in
Definition 3. Specifically, <Γ,θ
is individual i’s ordering over M as formulated in Definition
i
2 if individual i is in H, whereas it is the individual i’s ordering over M as formulated in
Definition 3 if individual i is not in H.
$
%
A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the strategic game Γ, <Γ,θ,H is a strategy profile
m such that for all i 2 N , it holds that
m <Γ,θ
(m0i , m−i ) , for all m0i 2 Mi .
i
$
%
$
%
Write N E Γ, <Γ,θ,H for the set of Nash equilibrium strategies of the strategic game Γ, <Γ,θ,H
$
%
and N A Γ, <Γ,θ,H for its corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The following definition is to formulate the designer’s Nash implementation problem
involving partially-honest individuals.
Definition 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. A mechanism Γ partially-honestly Nash implements
the SCR F : Θ ! X provided that for all θ 2 Θ there exists a truth-telling correspondence
6

TiΓ (θ) as formulated in Definition 1 for every i 2 N and, moreover, it holds that
%
$
F (θ) = N A Γ, <Γ,θ,H , for every pair (θ, H) 2 Θ × H.

If such a mechanism exists, F is said to be partially-honestly Nash implementable.
The objective of the mechanism designer is thus to design a mechanism whose Nash
equilibrium outcomes coincide with F (θ) for each state θ as well as each set H. Note that
there is no distinction between the above formulation and the standard Nash implementation
problem as long as Assumption 1 is discarded.

3. Why is a notion of truth-telling needed?
In this section, we present a necessary condition for partially-honest implementation,
which we call weak Maskin monotonicity. This condition prescribes that there be a deviant
partially-honest individual h(2 H) who can find a truthful outcome z that is equally good to
x according to her ordering Rh (θ0 ) if x is F -optimal at θ but not F -optimal at θ0 and there
is a monotonic change of preferences around x from θ to θ0 . Let us formalize the condition
as follows. Given a state θ, an individual i, and an outcome x 2 X, the weak lower contour
set of Ri (θ) at x is Li (θ, x) = {x0 2 X|xRi (θ) x0 }; and the indi§erent contour set of Ri (θ)
at x is Ii (θ, x) = {x0 2 X|xIi (θ) x0 }. Therefore:
Definition 5 The SCR F : Θ ! X is weak Maskin monotonic provided that for all H 2 H
and all θ, θ0 2 Θ if x 2 F (θ) \F (θ0 ) and Li (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0 , x) for all i 2 N , then there
exist one h 2 H and a non-empty set Sh (θ0 ; x, θ) ⊆ Lh (θ, x) such that the intersection
Sh (θ0 ; x, θ) \ Ih (θ0 , x) is not empty.
Let us present this condition from the viewpoint of necessity. Suppose that F is partiallyhonestly implementable by a mechanism Γ. Thus, for all θ̄ 2 Θ there exists a (non-empty)
$ %
truth-telling correspondence TiΓ θ̄ as formulated in Definition 1 for every i 2 N - for
$ %
whatever
it means
choice to be truthful - and, moreover, it holds that F θ̄ =
&
' for a strategy
$
%
N A Γ, <Γ,θ̄,H for every pair θ̄, H 2 Θ × H.
Suppose that x = g (m) is F -optimal at θ, that is, x 2 F (θ). Whilst the set g (Mi , m−i )
represents the set of outcomes that individual i can generate by varying her own strategy,
keeping the other individuals’ equilibrium strategy choices fixed at m−i , the set Si (θ0 ; x, θ) =
$
%
g TiΓ (θ0 ) , m−i represents the set of outcomes that this individual can attain by playing
truthful strategy choices for θ0 when the state moves from θ to θ0 , keeping the other individuals’ equilibrium strategy choices fixed at m−i . Given this idea of the set of Si (θ0 ; x, θ), we
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refer to elements of Si (θ0 ; x, θ) as truthful outcomes for individual i at the state θ0 when the
state moves from θ to θ0 and x is an F -optimal outcome at θ.
Also, suppose that when the state moves from θ to θ0 it happens that the lower contour
sets of preferences at x = g (m) are nested for every agent across the two states but this x
is not F -optimal at the new state θ0 . Thus, in order to break the Nash equilibrium via a
unilateral deviation there must exist a partially-honest individual h who can find it profitable
unilaterally to deviate from the strategy profile m supporting the outcome x as the outcome
of the mechanism Γ. This means that the strategy choice mh is not a truthful one for the
state θ0 (that is, mh 2
/ ThΓ (θ0 )) and that there is a truthful strategy choice m0h in ThΓ (θ0 )
such that this agent h judges the outcomes g (m0h , m−h ) = z and g (m) = x as equally good
according to her preference Rh (θ0 ). In other words, at least one partially-honest agent h
needs to find a truthful outcome z 2 Sh (θ0 ; x, θ) that is equally good to x according to
her ordering Rh (θ0 ) in order to have a unilateral non-material profitable deviation from the
profile m. Therefore, the outcome z is an element of Sh (θ0 ; x, θ) \ Ih (θ0 , x).
It is worth emphasizing that the above condition does not impose any restriction on the
class of SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. This is due to the fact that
one can always construct each agent i’s set of truthful outcomes Si (θ0 ; x, θ) by satisfying the
requirement that x 2 Si (θ0 ; x, θ) when the premises of the condition are met. In other words,
one can always make the implication of the condition trivially true. This construction is also
consistent with Theorem 1 of Dutta and Sen (2012), according to which the partially-honest
Nash implementability is assured by no veto-power when to be honest means to report the
true preferences of individuals.
Thus, in order to derive a non-trivial Maskin monotonicity-type condition and to explore
its implications for Nash implementability, we need to provide a definition of what it means
for a report to be truthful in our general environment. These will be the subject of what
follows below.

3.1 Truth-telling and honesty standards
The main practical aim of adopting an axiomatic approach to Nash implementation
theory is to distinguish between implementable and non-implementable SCRs. Thus, the
importance and usefulness of a necessary condition for implementation relies on its testability. This means that it has to involve only observable parameters such as preferences and
outcomes.
Furthermore, the seminal result of Dutta and Sen (2012) requires that an individual’s
report is truthful when it conveys the true preferences of individuals. However, since the
goal of this paper is to check the robustness of this seminal result to weaker notions of truthtelling, we adopt the view that an individual i is truthful when she states her true preference
8

as well as rankings (not necessarily complete) of outcomes that are consistent with the true
preferences of individuals for whom this individual i feels truth-telling concerns.
Let us formalize our notions of truth-telling as well as individuals’ honesty standards.
Let the family X have as elements all non-empty subsets of the space X × X as well as
the set whose element is the empty set. As usual, let us denote by X n the n-fold Cartesian
product of the family X .
An honesty standard of individual i, denoted by S (i) ≡ (Sj (i))j2N , is an element of X n
(that is, S (i) 2 X n ). Whilst our interpretation of the set Sj (i) = {?j } is that individual
i does not have any truth-telling concern about individual j, our interpretation of the set
Sj (i) 6= {?j } is that individual i concerns herself about individual j and the set Sj (i)
represents the collection of ordered pairs over which this i feels truth-telling concerns - when
she plays a strategy choice. An honesty standard of society is a list of honesty standards for
all members of society. Write S (N ) ≡ (S (i))i2N for a typical honesty standard of society.
We adopt the view that individual i concerns herself with at least her own self; that
is, Si (i) 6= {?i }. Moreover, the collection Si (i) of ordered pairs over which she feels truthtelling concerns has the property that this i is able to reveal truthfully her complete ranking
of outcomes; formally, we adopt the view that S (i) is an honesty standard of individual i
provided that
\
Si (i) Ri (θ) = Ri (θ) , for all θ 2 Θ.
(1)

The indispendability of these requirements for the honesty standard of individual i will be
discussed in remark 2. Our interpretation of these requirements is that individual i, to view
herself as an honest person, has at least to concern herself with the truth-telling of her own
preference ordering. This also means that individual i may display an honesty standard which
allows her to hide partially or totally other individuals’ rankings over outcomes without that
being harmful to her self view as an honest person.
Let us observe that this formulation of an honesty standard satisfies important properties. First, it does not depend on the current state of the world. Second, it is also independent
of the social objectives that society or its representatives want to achieve. Last but not least,
our formulation of honesty standards do not hinge on the existence of any mechanism. All
in all, it has the property to be formulated only on observable parameters.
We are now in a position to state our notion of truth-telling. Formally, for a given
state θ and individual i’s honesty standard S (i), to save notation we write RN (θ) \ S (i) for
Rj (θ) \ Sj (i) for each individual j. Thus:
Definition 6 For each Γ and each individual i 2 N with an honesty standard S (i) satisfying the requirement in (1), individual i’s truth-telling correspondence is a (non-empty)
correspondence TiΓ (·; S (i)) : Θ ! Mi with the property that for any two states θ and θ0 , it
9

holds that
TiΓ (θ; S (i)) = TiΓ (θ0 ; S (i)) () RN (θ) \ S (i) = RN (θ0 ) \ S (i) .

(2)

Strategy choices in TiΓ (θ; S (i)) will be referred to as truthful strategy choices for θ according
to S (i).
According to the above definition, in a state θ, every truthful strategy choice of individual i is to encode information of individuals’ rankings of outcomes that are consistent
with the profile of individuals’ orderings at the state θ. Moreover, if in two di§erent states,
say θ and θ0 , it holds that for each individual j, the set of ordered pairs in Sj (i) that are
consistent with individual j’s ordering at θ is identical to the set of ordered pairs that are
consistent with individual j’s ordering at θ0 (that is, Rj (θ) \ Sj (i) = Rj (θ0 ) \ Sj (i)), then
the sets of individual i’s truthful strategy choices for those two states need to be identical
according to her honesty standard S (i).
The above definition of truth-telling imposes a mild restriction on the class of truthtelling correspondences and, perhaps more interestingly, it represents a minimal notion of
honesty that one can formulate in our general environment. It is vital to emphasize here
that our notion of veracity encompasses, as a special case, that of \
Dutta and Sen (2012)
when each individual i’s honesty standard S (i) is such that Sj (i) Rj (θ) = Rj (θ), for
every individual j and every state θ.

4. Partial-honesty monotonicity
In this section, we discuss a condition that is necessary for the partially-honest Nash
implementation when the honesty standard of society is prescribed by S (N ). A condition
that is central to the implementation of SCRs in Nash equilibrium is Maskin monotonicity.
This condition says that if an outcome x is F -optimal at the state θ, and this x does not
strictly fall in preference for anyone when the state is changed to θ0 , then x must remain an
F -optimal outcome at θ0 . Let us formalize that condition as follows:
Definition 7 The SCR F : Θ ! X is Maskin monotonic provided that for all x 2 X and
all θ, θ0 2 Θ, if x 2 F (θ) and Li (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0 , x) for all i 2 N , then x 2 F (θ0 ).
An equivalent statement of Maskin monotonicity stated above follows the reasoning
that if x is F -optimal at θ but not F -optimal at θ0 , then the outcome x must have fallen
strictly in someone’s ordering at the state θ0 in order to break the Nash equilibrium via some
deviation. Therefore, there must exist some (outcome-)preference reversal if an equilibrium
strategy profile at θ is to be broken at θ0 .
10

Our variant of Maskin monotonicity for Nash implementation problems involving partiallyhonest individuals when the standard of honesty in a society is represented by S (N ) can be
formulated as follows:
Definition 8 The SCR F : Θ ! X is partial-honesty monotonic given the standard S (N )
(satisfying the requirement in (1) for each individual i) provided that for all x 2 X, all
H 2 H and all θ, θ0 2 Θ, if x 2 F (θ) \F (θ0 ) and Li (θ, x) ⊆ Li (θ0 , x) for all i 2 N , then there
exists at least one h 2 H such that RN (θ) \ S (h) 6= RN (θ0 ) \ S (h).
This says that if x is F -optimal at θ but not F -optimal at θ0 and, moreover, there is
a monotonic change of preferences around x from θ to θ0 (that is, whenever xRi (θ) x0 , one
has that xRi (θ0 ) x0 ), then the rankings of outcomes in the honesty standard of a partiallyhonest individual h has been altered by this monotonic change (that is, RN (θ) \ S (h) 6=
RN (θ0 ) \ S (h)). Stated in the contrapositive, this says that if x is F -optimal at θ and there
is a monotonic change of preferences around x from θ to θ0 and, moreover, the rankings of
outcomes in the honesty standard of a partially-honest individual h has not been altered by
this monotonic change, for every partially-honest individual h in H, then x must continue
to be one of the outcomes selected by F at the state θ0 .
\
Remark 1 Note that if each individual i’s honesty standard S (i) is such that Sj (i) Rj (θ) =
Rj (θ), for every individual j and every state θ, and if x is F -optimal at θ but not F -optimal
at θ0 and it happens that the lower contour sets of preferences at x are nested for every
agent across the two environments, then one has that RN (θ) 6= RN (θ0 ), and thus any SCR
is partial-honesty monotonic whenever the honesty standard of society is that studied by
Dutta and Sen (2012).
The above condition is necessary for partially-honest Nash implementation. This is
because if x is F -optimal at θ but not F -optimal at θ0 and, moreover, the outcome x has
not fallen strictly in any individual’s ordering at the state θ0 , then only a partially-honest
individual in the given conceivable set H can break the Nash equilibrium via a unilateral
deviation. Therefore, there must exist a partially-honest individual h 2 H whose equilibrium
strategy to attain x at (θ, S (N ) , H) is not a truthful strategy choice at (θ0 , S (N ) , H). This
means that RN (θ) \ S (h) 6= RN (θ0 ) \ S (h), according to Definition 6.
Note that the above definitions of partially-honest individuals (that is, Definition 2) as
well as of partially-honest Nash implementation can be easily adapted to the environments
with honesty standards. Now, a mechanism Γ and an environment with honesty standards
$
%
(θ, S (N ) , H) induces a strategic game Γ, <Γ,θ,S(N ),H , where:
&
'
Γ,θ,S(i)
<Γ,θ,S(N ),H ≡ <i

i2N
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is a profile of orderings over the strategy space M as formulated in Definition 2 and in Definition 3 where the truth-telling correspondence of individual i is that provided in Definition
6. Moreover, our notion of implementation in an environment with honesty standards can
be stated as follows:
Definition 9 Let Assumption 1 be given. Let the honesty standard of society be summarized in S (N ). A mechanism Γ partially-honestly Nash implements the SCR F : Θ ! X
provided that for all θ 2 Θ and H 2 H there exists for any h 2 H a truth-telling
correspondence ThΓ (θ; S (h)) as formulated in Definition 6 and, moreover, it holds that
$
%
F (θ) = N A Γ, <Γ,θ,S(N ),H . If such a mechanism exists, F is said to be partially-honestly
Nash implementable.
Therefore, our first main result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 Let Assumption 1 be given. Let the honesty standard of society be summarized
in S (N ). The SCR F : Θ ! X is partial-honesty monotonic given the standard S (N ) if it
is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Proof. Let Assumption 1 be given. Let the honesty standard of society be summarized in
S (N ). Suppose that Γ ≡ (M, g) partially-honestly Nash implements the SCR F : Θ ! X.
For any x 2 X, consider any environment (θ, S (N ) , H) such that x 2 F (θ). Then, there is
$
%
m 2 N E Γ, <Γ,θ,S(N ),H such that g (m) = x.
Consider any state θ0 2 Θ such that
for all i 2 N and all x0 2 X : xRi (θ) x0 =) xRi (θ0 ) x0 .

(3)

If there exists an individual i 2 N such that g (m0i , m−i ) Pi (θ0 ) g (m), then, from (3),
$
%
g (m0i , m−i ) Pi (θ) g (m), a contradiction of the fact that m 2 N E Γ, <Γ,θ,S(N ),H . Therefore,
we conclude that
for all i 2 N and all m0i 2 Mi : g (m) Ri (θ0 ) g (m0i , m−i ) .

(4)

Suppose that x 2
/ F (θ0 ). Then, the strategy profile m is not a Nash equilibrium of
%
0
Γ, <Γ,θ ,S(N ),H ; that is, there exists an individual i 2 N who can find a strategy choice
Γ,θ0 ,S(i)
m0i 2 Mi such that (m0i , m−i ) ≻i
m. Given that (4) holds, it must be the case that
i 2 H. From part (i) of Definition 2 we conclude, therefore, that
$

mi 2
/ TiΓ (θ0 ; S (i)) and m0i 2 TiΓ (θ0 ; S (i))

(5)
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and that
g (m0i , m−i ) Ri (θ0 ) g (m) .

(6)

Note that (4) and (6) jointly imply that
g (m0i , m−i ) Ii (θ0 ) g (m) .

(7)

We show that RN (θ) \ S (i) 6= RN (θ0 ) \ S (i). Assume, to the contrary, that
for all h 2 H : RN (θ) \ S (h) = RN (θ0 ) \ S (h) .

(8)

Definition 6 implies that
for all h 2 H : ThΓ (θ; S (h)) = ThΓ (θ0 ; S (h)) .

(9)

From (5) and (9), it follows that
mi 2
/ TiΓ (θ; S (i)) and m0i 2 TiΓ (θ; S (i)) .

(10)

Furthermore, given that requirement (1) holds, (7) and (8) jointly imply that Ri (θ) = Ri (θ0 ),
and so
g (m0i , m−i ) Ii (θ) g (m) .
(11)
Γ,θ,S(i)

Given (10) and (11) and the fact that i 2 H, Definition 2 implies that (m0i , m−i ) ≻i
m,
$
%
which is a contradiction of the fact that m 2 N E Γ, <Γ,θ,S(N ),H . Thus, F is partial-honesty
monotonic given the honesty standard S (N ).
Remark 2 The necessity of the partial-honesty monotonicity for implementation relies on
the requirement that every individual to view herself as an honest person has at least to concern herself with the truth-telling of her own preference ordering (that is, on the requirement
in (1)). Indeed, if this requirement fails to hold, then it would not be possible to conclude in
(11) that individual i judges the outcomes g (m0i , m−i ) and g (m) as equally good according
to her preference ordering at the state θ, and so it would not be possible to conclude that
this i can break the Nash equilibrium strategy profile m at the state θ via a unilateral deviation. From this perspective, we view that requirement as a general su¢cient condition for
honesty under which a non-trivial Maskin monotonicity-type condition for partially-honest
Nash implementation can be derived as a necessary condition.
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5. Equivalence result
The classic paper on Nash implementation theory is Maskin (1999), which shows that
where the mechanism designer faces a society involving at least three individuals, a SCR is
Nash implementable if it is monotonic and satisfies the auxiliary condition of no veto-power.2
The condition of no veto-power says that if an outcome is at the top of the preferences
of all individuals but possibly one, then it should be chosen irrespective of the preferences
of the remaining individual; that individual cannot veto it. Formally:
Definition 10 The SCR F : Θ ! X satisfies no veto-power provided that for all θ 2 Θ and
all x 2 X, if there exists i 2 N such that for all j 2 N \ {i} and all x0 2 X : xRj (θ) x0 , then
x 2 F (θ).
Proposition 1 (Maskin’s Theorem, 1999) If n ≥ 3 and F : Θ ! X is a SCR satisfying
Maskin monotonicity and no veto-power, then it is Nash implementable.
In a general environment such as that considered here, a seminal paper on Nash implementation problems involving partially-honest individuals is Dutta and Sen (2012). It shows
that for Nash implementation problems involving at least three individuals and in which
there is at least one partially-honest individual, the Nash implementability is assured by no
veto-power (Dutta and Sen, 2012; p. 157). From the perspective of this paper, Dutta-Sen’s
notion of truth-telling and their Theorem 1 can be formally restated as follows.
We have already mentioned that our notion of truth-telling encompasses, as a special
case, that of Dutta\and Sen (2012) provided that each individual i’s honesty standard S (i)
is such that Sj (i) Rj (θ) = Rj (θ), for every individual j and every state θ. As a generalization of Dutta and Sen’s (2012) honesty standard, let us consider a specific type of an
honesty standard S (i) of each individual i such that:
\
) *
for any j 2 N , Sj (i) 6= ?j implies Sj (i) Rj (θ) = Rj (θ) for every state θ.

Such a type of honesty standard ensures the existence
of a subgroup of society, denoted by
\
S (i), such that j 2 S (i) if and only if Sj (i) Rj (θ) = Rj (θ) for every state θ. Note
that by condition (1), i 2 S (i) holds. In this section, we focus our attention to this type
of honesty standards for all individuals. Then, to ease notation, in what follows we can
denote an honesty standard of individual i by S (i) with the property that i 2 S (i). Thus,
given a state θ, RS(i) (θ) is a list of orderings consistent with θ for individuals in the honesty
2

Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Sjöström (1991) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013)
refined Maskin’s theorem by providing necessary and su¢cient conditions for an SCR to be implementable in
(pure strategies) Nash equilibrium. For an introduction to the theory of implementation see Jackson (2001),
Maskin and Sjöström (2002) and Serrano (2004).
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standard S (i) of individual i. Our interpretation is that participant i concerns herself with
the truth-telling of preferences of individuals in her honesty standard when she plays a
strategy choice. To capture the requirement in (1), our definition endorses the view that an
individual concerns herself with at least her own self; that is, i 2 S (i).
Furthermore, given that in Dutta-Sen’s Theorem 1 the mechanism designer knows the
honesty standard of society, denoted by S (N ) ≡ (S (i))i2N , we also need the following
information assumption in order to state their result from the perspective of this paper.
Assumption 2 The mechanism designer knows the honesty standard of the society N .
Therefore:
Proposition 2 (Dutta-Sen’s Theorem 1, 2012) Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be
given. Let the honesty standard of society be summarized in S (N ), where S (i) ≡ N for all
i 2 N . If n ≥ 3 and F : Θ ! X is a SCR satisfying partial-honesty monotonicity for the
standard S (N ) and no veto-power, then it is partially-honestly Nash implementable.
As already noted in the previous section, any SCR is partial-honesty monotonic whenever the honesty standard of society is such that every individual considers truthful only
messages that encode the whole truth about preferences of individuals in society, that is,
S (i) = N for all i 2 N .
That is a particular kind of honesty standards of individuals but there is no reason to
restrict attention to such standards. Thus, in what follows, we are interested in understanding the kind of honesty standards of individuals which would make it impossible for the
mechanism designer to circumvent the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity. To this
end, let us introduce the following notion of standards of honesty of a society.
Definition 11 Given a society N involving at least two individuals, an honesty standard of
this society is said to be non-connected if and only if for all i 2 N , i 2
/ S (j) for some j 2 N .
Given that the honesty standard of individual i includes the individual herself, by definition of S (i), the honesty standard of society is non-connected whenever every one of its
members is excluded from the honesty standard of another member of the society. Simply
put, members of a society do not concern themselves with the same individual.
It is self-evident that the kind of honesty standards in Dutta-Sen’s theorem are not
non-connected because every individual of the society is interested in telling the truth about
the whole society. As another example of honesty standards of a society that are not nonconnected, consider a three-individual society where individual 1 concerns herself with herself
and with individual 2 (that is, S (1) = {1, 2}), individual 2 concerns herself with everyone
(that is, S (2) = {1, 2, 3}) and, finally, individual 3 concerns herself with herself and with
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individual 1 (that is, S (3) = {1, 3}). The honesty standard of this three-individual society
is not non-connected because everyone concerns themselves with individual 1.
Moreover, it is not the case that every non-connected honesty standard of society implies
that every individual honesty standard be of the form S (i) 6= N , as we demonstrate with
the next example. Consider a three-individual society where individual 1 is concerned only
with herself (that is, S (1) = {1}), individual 2 with everyone (that is, S (2) = {1, 2, 3})
and individual 3 with herself and with individual 2 (that is, S (3) = {2, 3}). The honesty
standard of this society is non-connected given that individual 2 and individual 3 are both
excluded from the honesty standard of individual 1 and individual 1 is excluded from the
honesty standard of individual 3.
As is the case here, the above definition is a requirement for the honesty standard
of a society that is su¢cient for partial-honesty monotonicity to be equivalent to Maskin
monotonicity when two further assumptions are satisfied. The first assumption requires that
the family H includes singletons. This requirement is innocuous given that the mechanism
designer cannot exclude any individual from being partially-honest purely on the basis of
Assumption 1.
The second requirement is that the set of states Θ takes the structure of the Cartesian
product of allowable independent characteristics for individuals. More formally, the domain
Θ is said to be independent if it takes the form
Θ=

Y

Θi ,

i2N

where Θi is the domain of allowable independent characteristics for individual i, with θi
as a typical element. A typical example of an independent domain is that each Θi simply
represents the domain of the preference orderings over X of individual i and so the domain
of the profiles of all individuals’ preference orderings on X has the structure of the Cartesian
product. In such a case, in a state θ = (θi )i2N , individual i’s preference ordering over X
depends solely on individual i’s independent characteristic θi rather than on the profile θ.
Given that a characteristic of individual i is independent from those of other individuals, the
equivalence result does not hold for the correlated values case.
The latter two requirements and the requirement that the honesty standard of society
needs to be non-connected are jointly su¢cient for partial-honesty monotonicity to imply
Maskin monotonicity. This can be seen as follows:
Consider a two-individual society where Θ is the set of states and X is the set of outcomes
available to individuals. Let S (i) be the honesty standard of individual i = 1, 2. Consider
an outcome x and a state θ such that x is an F -optimal outcome at θ. Consider any other
state θ0 such that individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x from
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θ to θ0 . Maskin monotonicity says that x must continue to be an F -optimal outcome at θ0 .
To avoid trivialities, let us focus on the case that θ 6= θ0 , which means that RN (θ) 6= RN (θ0 ),
given that we identify states with preference profiles.
If every individual were concerned with the whole society, we could never invoke (the
contrapositive of) partial-honesty monotonicity to conclude that x should remain F -optimal
at θ0 because RN (θ) 6= RN (θ0 ). Furthermore, consider the case that individual 1 concerns
herself with only herself, that is, S (1) = {1}, while individual 2 concerns herself with the
whole society, that is, S (2) = {1, 2}. Reasoning such as the one just used shows that partialhonesty monotonicity cannot be invoked if R1 (θ) 6= R1 (θ0 ). The argument for honesty
standards of the form S (1) = {1, 2} and S (2) = {2} is symmetric. Thus, the only case
left to be considered is the one in which everyone concerns themselves with only themselves,
that is, S (i) = {i} for i = 1, 2. In this situation, the honesty standard of society is reduced
to the non-connected one. Note that standards considered earlier were connected.
Suppose that preferences of individual 1 are identical in the two states, that is, R1 (θ) =
R1 (θ0 ). To conclude that x should be F -optimal at θ0 by invoking partial-honesty monotonicity we need to find individual 1 in the family H. The argument for the case R2 (θ) = R2 (θ0 )
is symmetric. Thus, if Ri (θ) = Ri (θ0 ) for one of the individuals, the requirement that the
singleton {i} is an element of H is needed for the completion of the argument.
Suppose that preferences of individuals are not the same in the two states, that is,
Ri (θ) 6= Ri (θ0 ) for every individual i, though they have changed in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from the state θ to θ0 . In this case, one cannot directly reach the conclusion of
Maskin monotonicity by invoking partial-honesty monotonicity. One way to circumvent the
problem is to be able to find a feasible state θ00 with the following properties: i) individuals’
preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x from θ to θ00 and Ri (θ) = Ri (θ00 )
for an individual i, and ii) individuals’ preferences change in that way around x from θ00 to
θ0 and Rj (θ0 ) = Rj (θ00 ) for individual j 6= i. A domain Θ that assures the existence of such
a state is the independent domain.
Even if one were able to find such a state θ00 by requiring an independent product
structure of Θ, one could not invoke partial-honesty monotonicity and conclude that x must
continue to be an F -optimal outcome at θ0 whenever the family H did not have the appropriate structure. This can be seen as in the following argument.
Suppose that Θ is an independent domain. Then, states take the form of profiles of
individuals’ characteristics, that is, θ = (θ1 , θ2 ) and θ0 = (θ01 , θ02 ). Moreover, the characteristic
of individual i in one state is independent from the characteristic of the other individual.
That is, Ri (θ) = Ri (θi ) and Ri (θ0 ) = Ri (θ0i ) for every individual i. The product structure
of Θ assures that the states (θ1 , θ02 ) and (θ01 , θ2 ) are both available and each of them has the
properties summarized above.
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Next, suppose that the family H has a structure given by {{1} , {1, 2}}. One can invoke
partial-honesty monotonicity for H = {1} to obtain that x is one of the outcomes chosen by
the SCR F at (θ1 , θ02 ) when the state changes from θ to (θ1 , θ02 ), but he cannot conclude that
x remains also F -optimal at θ0 when it changes from (θ1 , θ02 ) to θ0 . The reason is that partialhonesty monotonicity cannot be invoked again for the case H = {2} because the structure
of the family H does not contemplate such a case. The argument for the case that H takes
the form {{2} , {1, 2}} is symmetric. Thus, each of our requirements is indispensable, and
jointly they lead to the following conclusion:
Theorem 2 Let N be a society involving at least two individuals, Θ be an independent
domain and H include singletons. Suppose that the honesty standard of the society is nonconnected. Partial-honesty monotonicity is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Let n ≥ 2, Θ be an independent domain and H include singletons. Let S (N )
be a non-connected honesty standard of N . One can see that Maskin monotonicity implies
partial-honesty monotonicity.
For the converse, consider any SCR F : Θ ! X satisfying partial-honesty monotonicity.
Consider any x 2 X and any state θ 2 Θ such that x is an F -optimal outcome at θ. Moreover,
consider any state θ0 such that individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from θ to θ0 , that is,
for all i 2 N and all x0 2 X : xRi (θ) x0 =) xRi (θ0 ) x0 .
We show that x remains F -optimal at θ0 .
If characteristics of individuals in the honesty standard of individual i 2 N are identical
in the two states, that is, RS(i) (θ) = RS(i) (θ0 ), partial-honesty monotonicity for the case
H = {i} assures that x is still F -optimal at θ0 . Thus, let us consider the case RS(i) (θ) 6=
RS(i) (θ0 ) for every individual i 2 N .
To economize notation, for any subset K of N , write KC for the complement of K in
N . Therefore, for any non-empty subset K of N , we can write any non-trivial combination
$
%
of the states θ and θ0 as θK , θ0KC , where it is understood that θK is a list of characteristics
of individuals in K at the state θ and θ0KC is a list of characteristics of individuals in KC
at θ0 . Note that any state that results by that combination is available in Θ because of its
product structure.
Given that the honesty standard of society is non-connected, there must be an individual
j (1) 2 N who does not concern herself with the whole society, that is, S (j (1)) 6= N .
Consider the state
&
'
0
θK(1) , θK(1)C where K (1) ≡ S (j (1)) ,
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and call it θ1 . By construction, individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from θ to θ1 and, moreover, θK(1) = θ1K(1) . Partial-honesty monotonicity for the
case H = {j (1)} assures that the x remains an F -optimal outcome at θ1 .
If there is an individual i 2 N \ {j (1)} who is not concerned with any of the individuals
in the honesty standard of individual j (1), that is, the intersection S (i) \ S (j (1)) is empty,
then partial-honesty monotonicity for the case H = {i} assures that x is still F -optimal at
θ0 . This is because, by construction, individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic
way around x from θ1 to θ0 and θ1S(i) = θ0S(i) .
Thus, consider any individual j (2) 2 N \ {j (1)}, and denote by K (2) the set of individuals who jointly concern individual j (1) and individual j (2) according to their individual
honesty standards. Furthermore, consider the state
&

θK(2) , θ0K(2)C

'

where K (2) ≡ K (1) \ S (j (2)) ,

and call it θ2 . By construction, individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from θ1 to θ2 and, moreover, θ1S(j(2)) = θ2S(j(2)) . Partial-honesty monotonicity for
the case H = {j (2)} assures that x remains an F -optimal outcome at θ2 .
If there is an individual i 2 N \ {j (1) , j (2)} who is not concerned with any of the
individuals with whom individuals j (1) and j (2) are jointly concerned, partial-honesty
monotonicity for the case H = {i} assures that x is also F -optimal at θ0 . This is because, by construction, individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around
x from θ2 to θ0 and θ2S(i) = θ0S(i) .
Thus, consider any individual j (3) 2 N \ {j (1) , j (2)}, and denote by K (3) the set of
individuals that jointly concern individuals j (1), j (2) and j (3) according to their individual
honesty standards. Furthermore, consider the state
&

θK(3) , θ0K(3)C

'

where K (3) ≡ K (2) \ S (j (3)) ,

and call it θ3 . By construction, individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from θ2 to θ3 and, moreover, θ2S(j(3)) = θ3S(j(3)) . Partial-honesty monotonicity for
the case H = {j (3)} assures that x remains an F -optimal outcome at θ3 .
As above, if there is an individual i 2 N \ {j (1) , j (2) , j (3)} who is not concerned with
any of the individuals with whom individuals j (1), j (2) and j (3) are jointly concerned,
partial-honesty monotonicity for the case H = {i} assures that x remains also F -optimal
at θ0 , because, by construction, individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way
around x from θ3 to θ0 and θ3S(i) = θ0S(i) . And so on.
Since the society N is a finite set and the above iterative reasoning is based on its
cardinality, we are left to show that it must stop at most after n − 1 iterations.
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To this end, suppose that we have reached the start of the n − 1th iteration. Thus,
consider any individual j (n − 1) 2 N , with j (n − 1) 6= j (r) for r = 1, · · · , n − 2, and denote
by K (n − 1) the set of individuals that jointly concern individuals j (1), j (2) , · · · , j (n − 2)
and j (n − 1) according to their individual honesty standards. Furthermore, consider the
state
&
'
θK(n−1) , θ0K(n−1)C where K (n − 1) ≡ K (n − 2) \ S (j (n − 1)) ,

and call it θn−1 . As above, by construction,
individuals’
&
' preferences change in a Maskin
n−2
0
monotonic way around x from θ
≡ θK(n−2) , θK(n−2)C to θn−1 and, moreover, θn−2
S(j(n−1)) =
θn−1
S(j(n−1)) . Partial-honesty monotonicity for the case H = {j (n − 1)} assures that x is an
F -optimal outcome at θn−1 .
At this stage there is only one individual in N who is left to be considered. Call her j (n).
Suppose that this individual is concerned with one of the individuals for whom individuals
j (1), j (2) , · · · , j (n − 2) and j (n − 1) are jointly concerned. In other words, suppose that
the intersection K (n − 1) \ S (j (n)) is non-empty. Then, the whole society concerns itself
with one of its member, and this contradicts the fact that the honesty standard of society is
non-connected. Therefore, it must be the case that individual j (n) is not concerned with any
of the individuals with whom individuals j (1), j (2) , · · · , j (n − 2) and j (n − 1) are jointly
concerned according to their individual honesty standards. Partial-honesty monotonicity for
the case H = {j (n)} assures that x remains also F -optimal at θ0 given that, by construction,
individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin monotonic way around x from θn−1 to θ0 and
0
θn−1
S(j(n)) = θ S(j(n)) .
The iterative reasoning would stop at the rth (< n − 1) iteration if there were an individual i 2 N \ {j (1) , · · · , j (r)} who did not concern itself with any of the individuals in
K (r), that is, if the intersection S (i) \ K (r) were empty. If that were the case, then the
desired conclusion could be obtained by invoking partial-honesty monotonicity for H = {i}
because, by construction, it would hold that individuals’ preferences change in a Maskin
monotonic way around x from θr to θ0 and that θrS(i) = θ0S(i) .
In light of Theorem 1 and Maskin’s theorem, the main implications of the above conclusion can be formally stated as follows:
Corollary 1 Let N be a society involving at least two individuals, Θ be an independent
domain and H include singletons. Suppose that the honesty standard of the society is nonconnected. Let Assumption 1 be given. The SCR F : Θ ! X is Maskin monotonic if it is
partially-honestly Nash implementable.
Corollary 2 Let N be a society involving at least three individuals, Θ be an independent
domain and H include singletons. Suppose that the honesty standard of the society is non20

connected. Let Assumption 1 be given. Any SCR F : Θ ! X satisfying no veto-power is
partially-honestly Nash implementable if and only if it is Maskin monotonic.
Remark 3 In a related but not identical setting, Kartik and Tercieux (2012) study Nash implementation problems where agents can choose to provide evidence as part of their strategies.
In this setup, they show that any social choice function satisfying a weaker variant of Maskin
monotonicity, called evidence-monotonicity, and no veto-power is Nash implementable. In
an environment where there are partially-honest individuals, they show that even small intrinsic costs of lying create a substantial wedge between evidence-monotonicity and Maskin
monotonicity, in the sense that every social choice function is evidence-monotonic. Under
the assumptions of Theorem 2 and suitable specifications which resemble those of Example
2 in Kartik and Tercieux (2012; p. 333), one can show that this wedge disappears when
participants are allowed/forced to produce partial evidence of the true state according to a
non-connected (evidence) standard S(N ).3

6. Concluding remarks
The assumption that the mechanism designer knows the honesty standard of society is
often not met in reality, although it may be plausible in societies with a small number of
individuals in which the mechanism designer knows their sensitivity to honesty. Outside of
cases like those, we view as more plausible the assumption that the mechanism designer only
knows the type of honesty standards shared by individuals. Does the conclusion of Theorem
2 change in this case? The answer is no. After all, if individuals are honesty-sensitive, the
mechanism designer can test for connectedness of their honesty standards. If the test fails,
it would be in vain for him to attempt to Nash implement any SCR that is not Maskin
monotonic. The reason for it is easy to identify: the fact that he solely knows that the
honesty standard of society is non-connected can only make implementation harder than if
the actual non-connected honesty standards of participants were known.
3

To see it, let us suppose that individuals have separable preferences in the sense of Kartik and Tercieux
(2012; p. 238). That is, suppose that each agent’s (extended) preference ordering Ri (θ) over the outcomeevidence space X × Ei is represented by a utility function of the form Ui (x, ei , θ) = ui (a, θ) − ci (ei , θ),
where ci (ei , θ) represents agent i’s cost of producing evidence ei . Fix
Q any S (N ) and let the domain Θ be
independent. For each individual i, let the evidence space be Ei =
Θj . Fix any set H. For each h 2 H,
j2S(i)
$ 0%
$ 0%
$
%
let the cost function be ch θ, θ = 0 if $RS(h)% (θ) = RS(h) θ , otherwise, ch θ, θ0 = " > 0, where " can be
arbitrarly small. For each i 2
/ H, let ci θ, θ0 = 0 for every θ and θ0 . This
structure
implies that the set of
)
*
the least-evidence cost for h 2 H given the pair (x, θ) is Eh` (x, θ) = θ)S(h) while
it
is Ei` (x, θ) = Ei for
*
every i 2
/ H. Let the evidence function of invididual h 2 H be e∗h (θ) = RS(h) (θ) for every θ 2 Θ. Under
these specifications, one can now see from the proof of Theorem 2 that evidence-monotonicity (stated for
each H 2 H) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity.
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Theorem 2 is derived on the basis that in every state a strategy choice of an individual
is truthful if it encodes information of individuals’ preferences consistent with that state for
members of society in her honesty standard. This implies that if we arrange agents in a
directed circle and ask them to report their own preferences and those of their successors in
the circle, and the honesty standard of every individual includes herself and her successors,4
then this ‘simpler’ mechanism would impair the ability of the mechanism designer to escape
the limitations imposed by Maskin monotonicity. Then, a natural question that arises immediately is: Under what conditions would the positive result of Dutta and Sen (2012) be
restored? We answer this question in a companion paper (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2016a)
and it is as follows: The mechanism designer who knows that α(≥ 1) members of society have
a taste for honesty can expect to do well if no participant has a veto-power by structuring
communication with participants in a way that each of them reports her own preference and
those of other n − α successors who are in her honesty standard.
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991)
have shown that Maskin’s theorem can be generalized to Bayesian environments. A necessary condition for Bayesian Nash implementation is Bayesian monotonicity. In a Bayesian
environment involving at least three individuals, Bayesian monotonicity combined with no
veto-power is su¢cient for Bayesian Nash implementation provided that a necessary condition called closure and the Bayesian incentive compatibility condition are satisfied (Jackson,
1991). Although the implementation model developed in this paper needs to be modified
to handle Bayesian environments, we believe a similar equivalence result holds in those environments for suitably defined communication schemes (on this point, see Lombardi and
Yoshihara, 2013; section 5). This subject is left for future research.
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